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Abstract
The compatibility of merit principles and diversity management is particularly intriguing in
theory and practice. Although theoretical arguments for merit-based practices and diversity
management are well established, the effect of their dynamics on governmental performance
remains an empirical issue. This article examines the effect of merit principles, workforce
diversity, and diversity management on government performance, and inquiries about whether
diversity management efforts moderate the effect of merit-based practices. Analyzing a
combined dataset on federal agencies, this study finds that merit-based practices and diversity
management have independent positive impact on organizational performance, but there is no
significant relationship between workforce diversity and performance. Furthermore, the effect
of merit-based practices on organizational performance is moderated by gender diversity and
diversity management. Specifically, if an agency has a more diverse workforce in terms of
gender or more effective diversity management efforts, the positive effect of merit-based
practices on organizational performance is strengthened.
Introduction
Merit principles and diversity management undoubtedly are two of the most important managerial policies in the
contemporary public sector. Merit-based practices and diversity management have been developed through different
historical contexts with distinct managerial emphases. Merit principles have long served as a guiding value in public
personnel management since the enactment of the Pendleton Act of 1883 and been reinforced by the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). Merit principles have been powerful in replacing aristocracy, neutralizing the political
system, and strengthening professionalism of the public bureaucracy (Groeneveld and Van de Walle 2010).
Institutions that stem from merit principles epitomized by competitive hiring, protected tenure, and political neutrality
constitute a core foundation of American civil service (Ruhil and Camoes 2003).
An increasingly diverse workforce in the public sector, however, has posed new challenges to public personnel
management (Selden and Selden 2001; Riccucci 2002). Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers have raised concerns
about the compatibility of merit principles with policies and programs that focus on promoting demographic diversity
(McCrudden 1998; Woodard 2005). Affirmative action policies, for example, have been adopted in various areas,
such as legislatures, universities, and corporate boards, to promote diversity and achieve restorative justice. On one
hand, however, it has long been contested that affirmative action runs counter to meritocracy as the former offers
advantages to certain subpopulations based on ascribed characteristics (e.g., gender, race), but not on earned
qualifications. On the other hand, it has been argued that affirmative action policies can enhance meritocracy by
allowing for fair and equal opportunity to the historically disadvantaged. As such, the compatibility of merit principles
and diversity management, two key human resource management institutions in the public sector, is particularly
intriguing in theory and practice. Although theoretical arguments for merit-based practices and diversity management
have been well established, the effect of their dynamics on governmental performance remains an empirical issue.
This article examines the effect of merit principles, workforce diversity, and diversity management on federal
agencies’ performance, and inquiries about the extent to which workforce diversity and diversity management efforts
moderate the effect of merit-based practices. Specifically, this study partials out the effect of diversity on
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organizational performance by distinguishing workforce diversity and management efforts for diversity. We argue
that merit-based practices and diversity management are not contradictory but rather complementary, and have a
conditional relationship for governmental performance. In our analysis, workforce diversity represents the degree of
demographic composition in terms of gender and race, while diversity management refers to “a general set of human
resource policies aimed at making workplaces more tolerant and inclusive of people from historically
underrepresented groups, such as racial minorities and women” (Oberfield 2014: 778).
In the following sections, we first review the literature on merit principles, workforce diversity, and diversity
management, and then develop three sets of hypotheses on the relationship between merit principles, workforce
diversity, diversity management, and government performance. The description of data, measures, and analytic
method are followed. We then present and discuss our results and conclude with implications.
Theory and Hypotheses
Merit Principles and Governmental Performance
Merit principles “are designed to protect career employees against improper political influences or personal favoritism
in the recruiting, hiring, promotion, or dismissal processes, to assure that personnel management is conducted without
discrimination” (S. REP. No. 969, supra note 13, at 18; recited from O'Rourke 1993: 344). Established by the
Pendleton Act, the merit system in civil service was developed as a political and administrative response to detriments
of patronage and spoils systems and based on three principles: “entry to the system by way of competitive examination,
promotion and penalty based on performance, and protection from actions based on partisan political pressure”
(Pfiffner 2000: 27-28). Accordingly, the primary purpose of merit principles in early times was to eliminate political
corruption based on partisanship.
Although merit remains as an underlying principle for human resource management in the public sector, its specific
meaning has been evolving and reinterpreted in different ways, especially since the 2000s (Woodard 1998, 2005;
McCrudden 1995). More specifically, during the foundational era of civil service since 1883 through the 1950s,
personnel administration/management put an emphasis on efficiency and neutral competence through rule compliance
and administrative control. During the 1960s through the 1990s, the meaning of merit changed from one-size-fits-all
personnel management to human resource management that focused on social concerns related to fairness and equity.
Since the 2000s, the concept of merit has been associated with more negative connotations, as a merit-based institution
has been regarded as “a system of centralized regulation and compliance” (Woodard 2005, 110). Although fairness
and equity are part of the core values of merit principles (i.e., 5 U.S.C. 2301 (b): the second Merit System Principle –
Fair and Equitable Treatment), the contemporary focuses of human capital management are managerial flexibility to
meet specific needs of individual agencies and democratic values within the legal context of civil rights and
employment law (for details about the historical evolution of the merit concept, see Woodard 2005).
Previous research has noted the potential negative impact of merit-based hiring, e.g., rigidity and inflexibility (Maranto
1998; Ingraham, Selden, and Moynihan 2000; Woodard 2005). This line of research argues that hiring policies that
deviate from traditional merit criteria do not necessarily lead to a low level of government performance (Johnson
2015); instead, they may help promote high-quality service by creating a more malleable and receptive administration
with increased managerial authority, discretion, and flexibility (Maranto 1998; Green et al. 2006; Kellough and Nigro
2006; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; Ogrysko 2016). Maranto (1998) argues that the regular rotation of political
appointees helps expose public corruption, which runs counter to the perception that a spoils system brings more
corruption. Merit principles may prevent public employees “from being creative and innovative from time to time”
(Ogrysko 2016, an interview with Kevin Mahoney, the Chief Human Capital Officer in the U.S. Department of
Commerce).
Furthermore, insulation from politics may not always be in accord with modern managerial strategies that also aim at
enhancing administrative responsiveness and democratic accountability. As Ingraham (2006) suggested, it appears to
be unrealistic and politically indefensible for public administrators not to engage with key external stakeholders (e.g.,
elected officials and citizens), as it eventually is harmful to government’s effectiveness. Despite the consistence of the
Wilsonian separation of politics and administration with the concept of a merit-based civil service, “[a] key objective
of the CSRA, however, was to break down the barriers to responsiveness, cooperation, and coordination between
career managers and political appointees that had resulted in a ‘government of strangers’” (Brook 2000: 7).
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Nevertheless, since the 1990s, there is a long line of research offering strong evidence on the positive impact of
adherence to merit principles or the negative impact of violation of such practices (Kranz 1974; Huselid 1995; Gilmour
and Lewis 2006; Lewis 2008a, 2013). For example, Lewis (2013) finds that hiring based on the veteran status, not on
traditional merit criteria, may harm the quality of the federal public service. As Kettl (2015) noted, protecting civil
service employees against political abuse and ruling out at-will employment are an essential part of merit principles
and professionalism in government. In addition, as a modern application of merit principles, the idea of linking pay to
performance has been a popular strategy of public personnel management to enhance government performance and
flexibility, although the connection between pay-for-performance and government performance is rather unclear
(Brook 2000; Gerrish 2016; McCrudden 1998; Kellough and Lu 1993; Pearce and Perry 1983; Weibel, Rost, and
Osterloh 2010).
Given the consistent empirical evidence on the positive impact of merit-based practices, our first hypothesis is stated
as follows:
H1: Organizational compliance with merit principles is positively related to governmental performance.
Workforce Diversity, Diversity Management, and Governmental Performance
This section identifies two additional hypotheses pertaining to the relationship of workforce diversity and diversity
management with government performance, considering the conceptual distinctiveness between diversity and
diversity management. For starters, workforce diversity refers to “the extent to which a group is composed of
individuals who are similar on relevant dimensions, whether based on observable or unobservable attributes”, and
relevant dimensions include occupational, professional, and social (Pitts and Towne 2015: 368). Social diversity,
which has been an important research focus in the public management literature, encompasses race and ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, religion, language, and other cultural backgrounds. Given the increasingly diverse
workforce in the public sector, the theory of representative bureaucracy offers a foundation for the exploration of how
the demographic compositions of public organizations can shape equal access to decision making and equal
opportunity of employment for women and minorities. Pitkin (1967) suggests that representation enhances the value
of responsiveness in government as descriptive representation (“standing for”) leads to active representation (“act for”
the constituents they represent).
However, empirical evidence is inconclusive as to whether employee diversity is related to better government
performance (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole, and Walker 2005; Choi 2009; Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale 1999; Naff
and Kellough 2003; Pitts 2005, 2009; Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly 1992; Watson, Kumar, and Michaelson 1993).
Theoretically, two sets of competing driving forces are in play for the possible effect of employee diversity on
organizational effectiveness (Pitts and Towne 2015). On one hand, the theory on decision making suggests that
potential benefits from a diverse workforce (or a more representative workforce) are linked to the synergetic effect of
more talents, broader knowledge, new perspectives and ideas, as well as creativeness and innovation (Mosher 1968;
Ospina 2001; Anderson and Moynihan 2016). Also, diversity promotes social and political legitimacy as well as
normative values, such as fairness, justice, equal opportunity, and democracy (McCrudden 1998).
On the other hand, the theory on social categorization and similarity-attraction posits that “breakdowns in
communication, coordination, and cohesion” in diverse organizations results from a low level of mutual trust and less
confidence in peers’ capacities due to grouping and categorization (i.e., in-groups vs. out-groups) (Pitts and Towne
2015: 369; Williams and O’Reilly 1998). In this case, organizational diversity may weaken stability, engender
conflicts among members, maximize the feeling of exclusion and discrimination, and eventually undermines the
performance and legitimacy of an organization (e.g., for public organizations, see Mosher 1968; Lim 2006; Meier and
O’Toole 2006; Choi and Rainey 2010; Pitts 2005; Pitts et al. 2010; Sabharwal 2014; for private organizations, see
Cox and Blake 1991; Milliken and Martins 1996; Williams and O’Reilly 1998; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1999).
Furthermore, scholars acknowledge that when minority public administrators are more likely to advocate for the
interests of their co-ethnic groups (Mosher 1968; Lim 2006), representativeness may conflict with other values such
as equity and equality in the public sector (Selden 1997; Meier and O’Toole 2006) as well as the fundamental values
of democracy. The conflicting expectations regarding the effect of diversity on performance lead to the following
hypothesis.
H2a: Workforce diversity will have an impact on governmental performance.
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Meanwhile, empirical evidence consistently substantiates the positive effect of diversity management on
organizational performance. Diversity management is defined in a broad sense as “the commitment on the part of
organizations to recruit, retain, reward, and promote a heterogeneous mix of productive, motivated, and committed
workers” (Ivancevich and Gilbert 2000: 77). In recent years, policies and programs for diversity management have
adopted a more active and broad-based approach, including mentoring opportunities, training programs, familyfriendly policies, and advocacy groups (Bozeman and Feeney 2009; Kellough and Naff 2004; Pitts, 2006, 2009; Pitts
et al., 2010; Riccucci, 2002; Sabharwal 2014). The goal of diversity management through all these policies, programs,
and practices is to decrease the potential negative effect of workforce diversity and increase its potential positive effect
(Andersen and Moynihan 2016; Choi 2009, 2010; Choi and Rainey 2010; Oberfield 2014; Pitts 2009; Riccucci 2002).
Moskos and Butler (1997) shows that the U.S. Army has been successful in closing the racial gap by supporting equal
opportunity to black soldiers and using incentives and sanctions tied to the organizational mission.
However, organizational efforts on diversity management may not directly translate into improved performance and
inclusive work environment, unless the efforts are supported by the top-level leadership (Von Bergen et al. 2002;
Groeneveld and Verbeek 2012; Sabharwal 2014). Pitts (2006: 254) insightfully conceptualized three key components
of diversity management and the associated mechanisms through which an organization’s managerial responses to
diversity function to shape organizational performance. These components are recruitment and outreach (through
increased organizational heterogeneity and integration), building cultural awareness (through cultural synergy), and
pragmatic management policy (through job satisfaction). Diversity management without these key components may
bring about unintended negative effects such as reverse discrimination, demoralization, and reinforced stereotypes
(Von Bergen et al. 2002). One hypothesis related to diversity management follows:
H2b: Organizational efforts on diversity management are positively related to governmental performance.
Merit Principles and Diversity Management
Our further question concerns whether the effect of merit principles on performance is moderated by workforce
diversity and diversity management. The growing demand for diversity in the public sector has brought about a variety
of normative controversies and managerial challenges. One of the concerns relates to fairness and equity in human
resource management process (Woodard 2005). Beliefs arise that government’s policy intervention aimed at
promoting organizational diversity and representativeness, such as affirmative action and equal employment
opportunity (EEO) programs, inevitably increases the categorization and different treatment of employees, and
engender tensions with the core values of merit principles (Johns 2005; Kellough and Naff 2004; Malleson 2006;
McGregor 1974; Lim 2004). For instance, accompanying the adoption of antidiscrimination laws are backlash
reactions toward and devaluation of program beneficiaries and historically underrepresented employees, particularly
women and people of color (e.g., lower hiring criteria, discounting of qualification, less competence, substandard
performance) and gains by individuals of a protected class at the expense of other social members (e.g., reverse
discrimination) (Gilbert, Stead, and Ivancevich 1999; Heilman, Block, and Lucas 1992; Summers 1991; Von Bergen,
Soper, and Foster 2002). It implies a negative link between government’s corrective measures for compensating for
historical injustices and organizational performance, through undermining merit-based personnel systems.
Diversity, however, potentially can be compatible with merit principles in the broader context of human resource
management. As Pfiffner (2000: 28) suggested, affirmative action and equal opportunity regulations are part of the
merit system “to ensure that entry and promotion are based on merit rather than prejudice”. More important, often
neglected are the intrinsic distinction between diversity management and traditional, legalistic approaches to
redressing workplace discrimination (e.g., affirmative action, EEO programs), in terms of rationale, goal, approaches
to problems, and programmatic design (Kelly and Dobbin 1998). Contemporary civil service reforms also have sought
to modernize public sector management and boost government productivity by broadening the talent base that has
long been dominated by white males (Ink 2000: 46). As Pitts and Towne (2015: 374) observed, “managing for
diversity meant managing for all differences, whether based in race, ethnicity, gender, education, or function”.
Fundamentally speaking, diversity management recognizes value in diversity and focuses on “making sure all groups
of employees had what they needed in order to succeed at work”. As opposed to remedial initiatives that are justified
on legal, social, and moral grounds, diversity management is characterized by productivity, efficiency, and quality,
which are key management goals of merit principles (Kellough and Naff 2004: 65). In terms of administrative
responsibility in a democracy, merit principles hold public employees accountable by protecting them from external
influences (Kettl 2015), and diversity management enhances responsiveness and representation among civil servants
as a political and managerial strategy resulting from representative bureaucracy (Ospina 2001).
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In other words, all organizational members, not limited to target groups in antidiscrimination legal mandates, are
beneficiaries of the strategic efforts to manage diversity, which are conducive to realizing employees’ potential
underlying their diverse backgrounds, advancing employees’ overall skills and abilities, mitigating stigmatizing
perceptions, reshaping organizational culture and work environment, generating “positive spillover effect in the
workplace”, and enhancing organizational problem-solving capacities and competitive advantage (Gilbert, Stead, and
Ivancevich 1999, 64; Kidder et al. 2004; Pitts and Towne 2015; Thomas 1990; Von Bergen, Soper, and Foster 2002).
As such, diversity management is inherently in alignment with the expectations of the conventional merit-based
systems and with the mission of contemporary performance-based reforms (Kellough and Naff 2004), ultimately
leading to the improvement of organizational performance. We thus anticipate that government agencies’ diversity
management efforts complement merit-based principles and practices to enhance organizational effectiveness.
Accordingly, two hypotheses related to the relationship between merit principles, workforce diversity, and diversity
management follow:
H3a: The effect of organizational compliance with merit principles on governmental performance is positively
moderated by workforce diversity.
H3b: The effect of organizational compliance with merit principles on governmental performance is positively
moderated by diversity management efforts.
Data and Methods
With federal subagency 1 as the unit of analysis, this study examines the relationship between merit principles,
workforce diversity, diversity management, and organizational performance in 2006. To test the hypotheses, we
extract and analyze information on organizational performance, employees’ perception on personnel management
policies and practices (i.e., merit principles and diversity management), and workforce diversity from the Program
Assessment Rating Tool (PART), Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS), and FedScope federal human resources
datasets, respectively.
Organizational Performance
Unlike prior studies using self-reported survey, this study utilizes an archival performance indicator from the PART.
The dependent variable, organizational performance, is measured with PART scores of programs administered by a
given subagency. Implemented from 2004 through 2007, the PART was a program evaluation and administrative
accountability system managed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the George W. Bush
administration (for more details of the history of PART, see Dull 2006). During the period of implementation, over
1,000 federal programs (representing 98% of the federal budget) were assessed (Moynihan 2013). “PART itself was
a survey instrument, developed by OMB staff with outside advice. The instrument asked 25 to 30 questions divided
into four categories: program purpose and design, strategic planning, program management, and program results”
(ibid: 501) 2. Based on the evaluation by OMB budget examiners and agency officials, a numerical grade (from 0 to
100) was given to each dimension that carries a different weight (purpose and design: 20%, planning: 10%,
management: 20%, and results: 50%). A final, weighted total score (from 0 to 100) was generated for a given program
(Gilmour and Lewis 2006). PART scores have been broadly employed to represent the performance of federal agencies
or programs (Gallo and Lewis 2012; Gilmour and Lewis 2006; Jung 2013, 2014; Lewis 2008a; Miller 2015). Given
that program is PART’s unit of analysis, we use an aggregate measure for the subagency analysis, by generating an
averaged weighted total score from the evaluated programs for its supervising subagency. Using PART scores does
not exempt us from the concerns about subjective evaluation frequently associated with perceptual survey measures,
but it helps enhance measurement reliability and validity. Also, using data from multiple sources of different nature
helps mitigate the issue of common source bias (Favero and Bullock 2015).

1

A federal agency may be composed of several subagencies.
“The first section of questions asks whether a program's purpose is clear and whether it is well designed to achieve its objectives. The second
section involves strategic planning, and weighs whether the agency establishes valid annual and long-term goals for its programs. The third section
rates the management of an agency’s program, including financial oversight and program improvement efforts. The fourth section of questions
focuses on results that programs can report with accuracy and consistency” (archival ExpectMore.gov: https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html).
2
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Merit-Based Practices
The FHCS captures employees’ perception regarding agencies’ human resource management policies and practices.
The FHCS was initiated by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2002 and administered biennially
prior to 2010. Since being renamed as the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) in 2010, the survey has been
conducted annually. Respondents of this stratified sampling survey series are “full-time and part-time, permanent,
non-seasonal employees of Departments and/large agencies and the small/independent agencies that accept an
invitation to participate in the survey” (U.S. OPM 2018a). Covering various key human resource topics such as
personal work experiences, work unit, agency, supervisor, leadership, satisfaction, work/life, and demographics, the
FHCS (or FEVS) is “representative of the entire federal executive branch workforce as well as of employees within
individual agencies” to “gauge employee perceptions and attitudes about their jobs, working conditions, organizational
policies, coworkers, leaders, and performance” (Fernandez, Resh, Moldogaziev, and Oberfield 2015: 382; see also
U.S. OPM 2017: 1). Because of the stratified sampling approach, survey results are generalizable to the subagency or
agency populations.
The 2006 FHCS has a sample size of 221,479 and a government-wide response rate of 57% (U.S. OPM 2006). Using
the survey-generated statistical weights, we first aggregate and average responses to each selected FHCS item (coded
in a 5-point Likert scale, 1 as “strongly disagree” and 5 as “Strongly Agree”) at the subagency level (for a similar
analytical strategy, see Jung 2010; Oberfield 2014). We then use factor analysis to generate a factor score for the
perceived efficacy of the organizational policy on human resource management 3.
Federal agencies’ merit-based practices are measured with employees’ perception on a subagency’s compliance with
merit principles and its adoption of merit-based human resource management practices. Specifically, merit-based
hiring, promotion, and civil service protection are assessed with three questions: (1) “My work unit is able to recruit
people with the right skills”, (2) “Promotions in my work unit are based on merit”, and (3) “Arbitrary action, personal
favoritism and coercion for partisan political purposes are not tolerated”. Performance evaluation and appraisal
practices are assessed with three questions: (1) “Pay raises depend on how well employees perform their jobs”, (2)
“Awards in my work unit depend on how well employees perform their jobs”, and (3) “My performance appraisal is
a fair reflection of my performance”. The Cronbach’s α coefficient for the responses to these six questions is .929.
Factor analysis generates a factor score with an eigenvalue of 4.456. A higher value indicates a higher level of
perceived compliance with merit principles and efficacy of performance management in a given subagency.
Workforce Diversity
The information on federal workforce diversity is garnered from FedScope federal human resources data, the sources
of which are the Central Personnel Data File and Enterprise Human Resources Integration-Statistical Data Mart
managed by the OPM. This administrative dataset reports the number of federal civilian employees in terms of a broad
range of characteristics, including race and ethnicity, gender, occupational category, length of service, educational
level, and pay plan and grade (U.S. OPM 2018b).
This study focuses on two important dimensions of demographic diversity: race/ethnicity and gender. Research has
reported that the impact of workforce diversity on organizational performance can be different, depending on the
specific demographic characteristic. FedScope data define race/ethnicity in six categories: American Indian or Alaska
Native, Asian, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and White.
Gender is defined in two categories: female and male. The analysis uses the Blau index 4 to measure each dimension
of workforce diversity. A higher value indicates that a given subagency is more diverse with respect to specified
demographic characteristics.

3

“Factor analysis is used mostly for data reduction purposes: to get a small set of variables (preferably uncorrelated) from a large set of variables
(most of which are correlated to each other); [or] to create indexes with variables that measure similar things (conceptually)” (Torres-Reyna 2010:
2). An eigenvalue represents the “total variance accounted by each factor. The sum of all eigenvalues = total number of variables. Kaiser criterion
suggests to retain those factors with eigenvalues equal or higher than 1” (ibid: 3). The predicted common factor score has mean zero and standard
deviation 1. Factor analysis has been widely used to generate measures for latent concepts based on survey questions.
4
Diversity = 1 – ΣPi2, where Pi is the proportion of group members in a particular category i. 0 and 1 represents perfect homogeneity and
heterogeneity, respectively.
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Diversity Management Efforts
Akin to merit-based practices, a measure for organizational efforts for diversity management is developed from the
FHCS (Choi 2009; Oberfield 2014). Three items include: (1) “Supervisors/team-leaders in my work unit are
committed to a workforce representative of all segments of society”, (2) “Policies and programs promote diversity in
the workplace (e.g., recruiting minorities and women, training in awareness of diversity issues, mentoring)”, and (3)
“Managers/supervisors/team leaders work well with employees of different backgrounds”. The Cronbach’s α
coefficient for the responses to these three items is .914. Factor analysis generates a factor score with an eigenvalue
of 2.561. A higher value indicates a higher level of perceived efficacy of diversity management efforts in a given
subagency.
Control Variables
The empirical models include several factors that also exert influence on a public agency’s performance. Organizations
that have sufficient resources are more likely to have better performance (Gallo and Lewis 2012; Jung 2013).
Organizational resources are measured with two variables: the aggregated actual 2005 program budget (dollars in
millions, in natural logarithm) and the number of employees. To consider the influence of different program feature
on an agency’s performance, we include the number of programs of different types: direct federal, credit, research and
development, block/formula grant, competitive grant, capital assets and service acquisition, and regulatory (Gallo and
Lewis 2012). Federal employees in agencies with science/technology or regulatory functions are more likely to
evaluate favorably the organizations’ leadership, management, and work climate, which eventually would bear on
organizational performance (Lewis 2008a). The analysis thus includes two indicator variables representing whether a
subagency’s primary mission is science/technology and whether a subagency is engaged in regulatory activities.
Agencies with a higher level of professionalism should have better organizational performance. On one hand, “The
proportion of professional employees in the agency is closely connected with autonomy in human resources.
Professionals exercise influence through the application of their expertise by deciding crucial issues of society” (Lee
and Whitford 2013: 692). On the other hand, agencies that are more professionalized are less politicized, which in
turn introduces fewer interferences in organizations’ functioning and management (Lewis 2008a). The analysis
controls for the effect of professionalism with the percent of employees in the professional category (in FedScope
data, employee occupational categories include professional, administrative, clerical, technical, blue-collar, and
unknown).
Lastly, two agency characteristics are included. An indicator variable is used to represent whether a subagency is an
independent commission, which usually is subject to less political control than agencies headed by a single
administrator (Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2007). The other indicator variable measures whether a subagency’s
ideology is “statistically distinguishable in a liberal direction from 0” (Lewis 2008b). “Since PART scores are
generated by a Republican Administration, programs in liberal agencies will get systematically lower grades if the
grades are politicized” (Gallo and Lewis 2012: 228). Data on agencies’ primary mission, commission status, and
ideology are collected from Lewis (2008b).
Estimating Models
We use the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to estimate the effects of the predictor variables on federal
agencies’ performance, with standard errors clustered at the subagency level. The final sample size is 88 (or 87,
depending on the model), for subagencies that have valid information on both the dependent and predictor variables
(agencies and subagencies listed in appendix). To evaluate the moderating effects of workforce diversity and diversity
management efforts on the impact of merit-based practices on agency performance (H3a and 3b), the analysis uses
interaction terms between these three focal variables.
Results
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1. In 2006, the mean of the average total PART scores of programs at
the subagency level is 70.526 (minimum: 42.625, maximum: 93.464). The correlation matrix for the continuous
predictor variables is reported in Table 2. Table 3 presents the effects of the predictor variables. Specially, Model 1
examines the independent effect of employees’ perceptions of merit-based practices. Models 2 and 3 assess the effects
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of workforce diversity and diversity management efforts. Models 4 and 5 comprehensively evaluate the interactive
effects of two sets of organizational management efforts and workforce diversity on the performance of federal
agencies.
[Tables 1 and 2 about Here]
As Model 1 shows, the effective implementation of merit-based policies is conducive to organizational performance.
Holding other variables constant, a one-unit increase in merit-based efficacy score is associated with an increase of
approximately 4.688 points in a subagency’s PART score. Only one control variable is statistically significant. A
subagency that administers a large number of research and development programs has a higher PART score. To our
surprise, neither dimension of demographic diversity (i.e., race/ethnicity, gender) is statistically significant (Model 2).
Two control variables have explanatory strength in accounting for organizational performance. Akin to Model 1, the
number of research and development programs is positively associated with a subagency’s performance. By contrast,
management of a large number of block/formula grant programs is likely to dampen organizational performance.
Model 3 simultaneously evaluates the independent effects of workforce diversity and diversity management efforts.
Diversity management efforts remain statistically significant. With other factors being the same, a one-unit increase
in employees’ perceived efficacy of diversity management efforts is related to an increase in the PART score by 5.2
points in a given subagency. The number of research and development programs still has a positive effect, whereas
the size of competitive grant programs has a negative effect.
[Table 3 about Here]
Model 4 displays the relationship between organizational workforce diversity and merit principles. The effect of meritbased practices on organizational performance is moderated by gender diversity, as the interaction term between these
two variables is statistically significant in the positive direction. As the magnitude and significance of the effect of
merit-based policies vary across the conditional values of gender diversity, the results are interpreted in terms of the
marginal effect based on the post-estimation analysis. The conditional marginal effect of the perceived efficacy of
merit-based policies increases as a function of gender diversity (Figure 1, see Mitchell 2012: 135). When the score of
gender diversity is .447 (at the 25th percentile), the marginal effect of merit-based practices becomes statistically
significant. At this level, a one-unit increase in the perceived efficacy of organizational merit-based practices is
associated with an increase of 3.647 points in the PART grade. By contrast, when an agency has a score of .497 (at
the 95th percentile) in gender diversity, its performance grade increases by 7.69 points, corresponding to a one-unit
increase in the perceived effectiveness of organizational merit-based policies. It should also be noted that when an
agency has a very low level of gender diversity (e.g., below a score of .397), the marginal effect of merit-based policies
is negative. In a subagency where employees perceive merit-based policies as effective, the predicted PART score is
higher if the organization also has a more diverse workforce in terms of gender (Figure 2).
[Figures 1 and 2 about Here]
Model 5 assesses the interactive effect of diversity management efforts and merit-based practices. Like Model 4, the
interaction variable is statistically significant in the positive direction. The estimates of the effect of merit-based
practices increase as a function of diversity management efficacy (Figure 3). Yet the marginal effect of the perceived
efficacy of merit-based policies is statistically significant only in organizations with the highest level of the perceived
effectiveness of diversity management efforts. For instance, when the score of diversity management efficacy is 2.264
(above the 95th percentile), a one-unit increase in organizations’ merit-based practices is correlated with a 4.717-point
increase in the PART grade. At the high end of diversity management efforts, as employees recognize merit-based
policies as more effective, the predicted PART score increases (Figure 4). For instance, in a subagency that has a score
of 1.459 for the perceived effectiveness of merit-based policies, the predicted PART score is 83.28. By contrast, if
merit-based practices are less effective (e.g., a score of -1.644), the subagency has a lower predicted PART score (e.g.,
70.103).
[Figures 3 and 4 about Here]
Models 1, 2, 3, and 5 do not suggest the problem of multicollinearity, but Model 4 does indicate this issue. Yet we
choose to keep the concerned variables in the model, as the estimation of coefficients is unbiased and dropping the
data would cause specification error. Considering the multicollinearity problem, we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis in our analysis, even though the effect may exist in the population (Gujarati 2002).
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Discussion and Conclusion
This study aims to explore the relationship between merit-based practices, workforce diversity, diversity management
efforts, and government performance. Alongside echoing the calls for a continued understanding of the role of merit
principles in shaping public agencies’ performance, it sheds light on the complex relationship between merit-based
policies and managing for diversity, both of which are key components of human resource management in the public
sector. The study contributes to the literature of public management by focusing on the differential effects of workforce
diversity and diversity management on government performance, as well as their dynamics with government’s meritbased practices. To test the hypotheses, this study analyzes three different datasets using weights and weighted
averages, with federal subagency as the unit of analysis. This research design allows us to avoid problems associated
with relying on information from one source and to examine government performance measured with
objective/archival data instead of subjective/perceptual survey data.
The findings suggest a clear pattern consistent with our expectations and point to the important topics for future
research. Overall, merit-based practices and diversity management efforts have independent positive impacts on the
performance of federal agencies. However, there is no significant independent effect of workforce diversity in terms
of gender or race/ethnicity. The results imply the possibility that the twofold effects of diversity cancel out its impact
on performance. Considering the competing arguments on the effect of diversity, the null finding is not uncommon,
as suggested by previous studies. Moreover, the effect of merit-based practices on organizational performance is
reinforced by gender diversity and diversity management. The positive effect of merit-based practices on agency
performance is statistically significant at the highest end of diversity management efforts. The results largely comport
with the public management literature regarding the vital role of managers in shaping organizational performance
(O’Toole and Meier 1999). The complementary relationship between merit-based practices, workforce diversity
(gender specifically), and diversity management efforts implies the importance of adopting managerial strategies and
tactics that further achieve workforce demographic representation, bolster the benefits of diversity, and promote merit
principles in the public sector.
There is a reason for caution in understanding our findings, however, given that this study does not allow for an
examination of several relevant factors identified in prior research, such as managerial discretion, policy congruence,
and policy areas salient to minorities (e.g., Keiser et al. 2002; Wilkins and Keiser 2006). For instance, organizations
with greater competence are more likely to have a higher level of performance. Furthermore, we acknowledge that the
latent factors of merit-based practices and diversity management may not be significantly different from some of the
generic concepts such as trust in management. The measurement problem, however, may not be resolved by using
different questionnaire items for each variable in the same dataset. Two variables in the interaction term (i.e., meritbased practices and gender diversity) were highly correlated in Model 4, making it difficult to isolate the individual
effect of the independent variables.
In addition to the possibility of omitting certain variables, the present study has several noteworthy limitations, raising
avenues for future research on the performance of public organizations. First, using cross-sectional data without time
dimension limits our capacity of exploring the causal relationship between the dependent variable and the focal
independent variables. Data unavailability for the key program- and subagency-level variables is a practical reason
for us to examine the relationship between organizational performance, merit-based practices, and diversity
management efforts in a single year (i.e., 2006). As such, this practice does not consider the potential effect of temporal
factors on organizational effectiveness; also the cross-sectional feature of the present study does not allow for causal
inferences.
Lastly, the current literature have identified a variety of elements of merit principles and practices, this study only
uses one composite measure from different questions in the FHCS, as factor analysis points to one underlying concept.
This may be related to the limitation of using survey data with a selected set of questions and the assumptions regarding
the key elements of merit principles. Further research may uncover additional aspects of merit-based practices that
may be in accord or conflict with each other, thus reinforcing or confounding their causal connections with
governmental performance.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
N
PART score (0-100)
70.526
12.506 42.625 93.464 89
Merit-based practices (factor score)
0
1
-2.457 3.078 89
Diversity management efforts (factor score)
1.61E-09
1
-2.736 3.025 89
Gender diversity (0-1)
0.466
0.034
0.367
0.500 88
Race diversity (0-1)
0.450
0.120
0.139
0.662 87
Actual 2005 program budget (millions)
10143.2
39813
3
343866 89
Direct federal program (number)
1.708
2.752
0
19
89
Credit program (number)
0.146
0.490
0
3
89
Research and development program (number)
0.517
1.516
0
10
89
Block/formula grant program (number)
0.798
1.955
0
14
89
Competitive grant program (number)
1.169
2.731
0
16
89
Capital assets/service acquisition program (number)
0.404
1.145
0
8
89
Regulatory program (number)
0.427
0.796
0
5
89
Science/technology agency (0,1)
0.258
0.440
0
1
89
Regulatory agency (0,1)
0.337
0.475
0
1
89
Professional employees (%)
25.394
20.609
0.709 77.986 88
Employees (number)
8857.14
15259.6
25
91340 88
Commission (0,1)
0.112
0.318
0
1
89
Liberal agency (0,1)
0.292
0.457
0
1
89
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Table 2. Pairwise Correlations of the Predictor Variables

Merit-based practices
Diversity management efforts
Gender diversity
Race diversity
Actual 2005 program budget
Direct federal program
Credit program
Research and development
Block/formula grant program
Competitive grant program
Capital assets/service acquisition
Regulatory program
Professional employees
Total employees

Block/formula grant program
Competitive grant program
Capital assets/service acquisition
Regulatory program
Professional employees
Employees
* p < 0.05

Meritbased
practices

Diversity
management
efforts

1
0.8055*
0.3021*
-0.1086
-0.0158
-0.0251
-0.1273
0.0944
-0.145
-0.0153
-0.0214
0.1627
0.2658*
-0.2

1
0.185
-0.0954
-0.0053
0.0081
0.0012
0.0779
-0.1375
-0.0223
-0.0864
0.149
0.1444
-0.1167

Research and
development
program
-0.0755
0.3328*
0.3364*
0.041
0.3662*
-0.0205

Gender
diversity

Race diversity

1
0.1208
-0.1183
0.0481
0.1891
-0.0226
-0.0423
-0.0311
-0.024
0.0642
0.2201*
-0.3083*

Block/formula
grant program
1
0.564*
0.0369
-0.1483
0.0957
-0.1029

Competiti
ve grant
program
1
0.2504*
-0.138
0.1392
-0.1065

14

Actual
2005
program
budget

1
0.1313
-0.0256
0.008
-0.2148*
0.1863
0.1337
-0.0738
-0.211*
-0.0782
0.0694
Capital
assets/service
acquisition

1
-0.1043
0.0353
0.0906

1
0.0267
-0.0455
-0.0425
0.1463
-0.0129
-0.0509
-0.1188
-0.0631
0.1235

Direct
federal
program

1
0.0067
-0.1459
0.2318*
0.114
0.1172
-0.098
-0.1629
0.3526*

Credit
program

1
-0.1029
0.0193
-0.0611
-0.0052
-0.1326
-0.1839
-0.0885

Regulatory
program

Professional
employees

1
0.1785
0.0073

1
-0.1659
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Table 3. The Estimates of the Effects of Predictors on Organizational Performance
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Coef.
SE
Coef.
SE
Coef.
SE
--------Merit-based practices
4.688***
1.390
--------Diversity management efforts
5.202***
1.489
----Gender diversity
-15.567
47.896
-39.171
45.542
----Race diversity
12.732
15.038
11.347
14.352
Actual 2005 program budget
-0.238
0.663
-0.686
0.828
-0.827
0.796
Direct federal program
0.304
0.738
0.574
0.842
0.578
0.688
Credit program
0.564
1.643
0.187
1.967
0.435
1.730
Research and development program
1.502***
0.519
1.804*
0.912
1.617**
0.626
Block/formula grant program
-1.103
0.817
-1.674*
0.884
-1.056
0.792
Competitive grant program
-0.844
0.536
-0.747
0.575
-1.003*
0.519
Capital assets/service acquisition program
-0.991
0.914
-0.781
1.019
-0.488
0.863
Regulatory program
-0.982
1.822
-0.060
2.233
-1.433
1.727
Science/technology agency
1.857
2.837
1.101
3.101
2.266
2.948
Regulatory agency
-3.819
3.548
-3.096
3.844
-2.121
3.573
Professional employees
-0.022
0.082
0.047
0.074
0.014
0.082
Employees
-7E-05
7.1E-05
-0.0001
9.5E-05 -1E-04
7.9E-05
Commission
4.060
6.005
0.642
5.342
3.737
6.574
Liberal agency
-0.983
3.338
-0.908
3.841
0.525
3.774
Constant
75.589†
5.474 78.665*** 23.362
90.777
22.249
N
88
87
87
F Statistic
4.33†
1.6*
3.46†
2
R
0.294
0.202
0.338
Robust standard errors in the right column
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; † p < 0.001
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Table 3. The Estimates of the Effects of Predictors on Organizational Performance
(Continued)
Model 4‡
Model 5
Coef.
SE
Coef.
SE
Merit-based practices
-24.059
19.763
1.736
2.055
----Diversity management efforts
3.817*
2.244
----Gender diversity
8.639
13.636
----Race diversity
-17.994
58.745
----Merit-based practices × race diversity
-18.701
11.579
----Merit-based practices × gender diversity
80.855*
42.314
----Merit-based practices × diversity management efforts
1.317*
0.707
Actual 2005 program budget
-0.415
0.770
-0.480
0.679
Direct federal program
0.760
0.666
0.377
0.677
Credit program
2.034
1.793
0.260
1.750
Research and development program
1.809**
0.632
1.268**
0.559
Block/formula grant program
-1.211
0.838
-0.896
0.786
Competitive grant program
-1.015*
0.556
-0.947*
0.545
Capital assets/service acquisition program
-0.878
0.930
-0.728
0.930
Regulatory program
-1.312
2.115
-1.823
1.527
Science/technology agency
2.420
2.880
2.470
2.850
Regulatory agency
-3.610
3.841
-2.544
3.406
Professional employees
0.018
0.085
0.004
0.084
Employees
-0.000*
7.5E-05
-.0000 7.3E-05
Commission
4.146
6.609
4.331
6.023
Liberal agency
-0.934
3.713
-0.499
3.482
Constant
78.943*** 28.654 75.046†
5.772
N
87
88
F Statistic
3.68†
4.05†
2
R
0.358
0.345
Robust standard errors in the right column
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; † p < 0.001
‡ The variables Merit-based practices and Gender diversity are highly correlated in Model 4.
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Conditional Marginal Effect of Merit-Based Practices
-10
-5
0
5
10

Figure 1. The Conditional Marginal Effects of Merit-Based Practices,
Moderated by Gender Diversity
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Figure 2. The Predicted Performance Scores,
by Merit-Based Practices and Gender Diversity
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Conditional Marginal Effect of Merit-Based Practices
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Figure 3. The Conditional Marginal Effects of Merit-Based Practices,
Moderated by Diversity Management Efforts
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Figure 4. The Predicted Performance Scores,
by Merit-Based Practices and Diversity Management Efforts
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Appendix: Federal Agencies and Subagencies in This Study

Agency
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
United States Agency for International Development
African Development Foundation
Department of Commerce
Department of Commerce
Department of Commerce
Department of Commerce
Department of Commerce
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
National Credit Union Administration
Department of Justice
Department of Justice
Department of Justice
Department of Justice
Department of Justice
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of Labor
Department of Labor
Department of Labor
Department of Labor
Department of Labor
Export-Import Bank
Department of Education
Department of Education
Department of Education
Trade and Development Agency
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services

Subagency
Agricultural Marketing Service
Agricultural Research Service
Rural Housing Service
Risk Management Agency
Foreign Agricultural Service
Forest Service
Natural Resources Conservation Service
National Agricultural Statistics Service
Food and Nutrition Service
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Farm Service Agency
United States Agency for International Development
African Development Foundation
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
International Trade Administration
Patent and Trademark Office
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Bureau of the Census
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
National Credit Union Administration
Drug Enforcement Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Bureau of Prisons/Federal Prison System
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Marshals Service
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Employment Standards Administration
Employment and Training Administration
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Employee Benefits Security Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Export-Import Bank
Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services
Federal Student Aid
Office of Postsecondary Education
Trade and Development Agency
Administration on Aging
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Health Resources and Services Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Indian Health Service
National Institutes of Health

19

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Public Personnel Management,
published by SAGE. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1177/0091026019848459

Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Broadcasting Board of Governors
Inter-American Foundation
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Corporation for National and Community Service
Federal Election Commission
National Science Foundation
National Archives and Records Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Peace Corps
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Department of State
Social Security Administration
Department of Transportation
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury
Department of the Treasury

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Administration for Children and Families
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
United States Coast Guard
United States Secret Service
Transportation Security Administration
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Office of the Under Secretary for Science and Technology
Broadcasting Board of Governors
Inter-American Foundation
Bureau of Land Management
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Reclamation
U.S. Geological Survey
National Park Service
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement
Minerals Management Service
Corporation for National and Community Service
Federal Election Commission
National Science Foundation
National Archives and Records Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Peace Corps
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Department of State
Social Security Administration
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Highway Administration
Office of Thrift Supervision
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
Internal Revenue Service
Financial Management Service
Bureau of the Public Debt
United States Mint
Office of the Comptroller of Currency
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